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This paper investigates whether national evaluation of decentralised government performance 
tends, by lessening local information spill-overs, to reduce the scope for local performance 
comparisons and consequently to lower the extent of spatial auto-correlation among local 
government expenditures. It analyses UK local government expenditures on personal social 
services before and after the introduction of a national performance assessment system 
(SSPR, Social Services Performance Rating) that would attribute a rating to each local 
authority. The empirical evidence suggests that the introduction of the SSPR has substantially 
reduced policy mimicking among neighboring jurisdictions. 
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The past decade has witnessed a surge of empirical research on strategic
interaction among local governments inthe settingof tax rates,1 expenditures
on public services,2 and standards and regulatory measures.3
In particular, a strand of the literature has explored the issue of welfare
competition.4 In the presence of welfare recipients' mobility, decentralised
welfare policies would be set strategically, in the sense that an authority
would look to neighboring jurisdictions' bene¯t levels before setting its own
to avoid becoming a \welfare magnet," and would respond to the policies
enacted by its neighbors, leading to a race to the bottom and a possible
erosion of the welfare state (Sinn [48]).
The existing empirical literature on decentralised welfare policy setting
typically uses US state data and relies on the race to the bottom notion.5
It tests for inter-state welfare competition, by estimating a reduced-form
reaction function where the bene¯t level in a state is related to a weighted
average of neighboring states' bene¯t levels.6
As far as EU countries are concerned, while it is rarely the case that
welfare policies are set in a decentralised way - with most redistributive
policies being decided at the national level, - still in several instances local
authorities provide social services that a®ect the well-being of the poor.
In the UK, for instance, while the bulk of welfare policies is set at the
1Ladd [36], Besley and Case [8], Case [21], Heyndels and Vuchelen [32], Brett and
Pinkse [14], Brueckner and Saavedra [18], Buettner [19], Revelli [39], Bordignon et al.
[12].
2Case et al. [22], Kelejian and Robinson [35], Murdoch et al. [38], Bivand and Szy-
manski [10], [11], Revelli [41], [42], Baicker [5].
3Brueckner [15], Fredriksson and Millimet [30], [31].
4Smith [49], Shroder [47], Smith [50], Rom et al. [43], Figlio et al. [29], Saavedra [44],
Wheaton [53], Bailey and Rom [6], Berry et al. [7].
5Brueckner [16] reviews the empirical welfare competition literature.
6Shroder [47] and Berry et al. [7] represent exceptions, in that they estimate struc-
tural models including a bene¯t setting equation and a recipiency ratio (poverty rate)
determination equation.
2national level (minimum income guarantee, jobseeker's allowance and hous-
ing bene¯ts), yet local authorities devote a share of total revenues to social
expenditures, in terms of care and assistance to the elderly, help to families
and children with social needs, as well as a number of services to people with
disabilities and health needs (Social Services Inspectorate [51]).
In ¯nancial year 2000/2001,7 English local authorities spent over $10 bil-
lion on personal social services, corresponding to 20% of total local spending
and amounting to almost half of expenditure on education (CIPFA [23]).
While most of the above social services do not typically take the form of a
money transfer to the poor, still they mainly bene¯t low-income households,
in that the need for social services tends to be correlated with income depri-
vation (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [28]).
An interesting feature of local spending on personal social services in the
UK is that it shows positive spatial auto-correlation, in the sense that the
policies of nearby localities - that is, of localities sharing a border - appear
to be more correlated than those of far-away ones. For instance, in ¯nan-
cial year 2000/2001 the standard measure of spatial dependence, the Moran
statistic (Anselin [1]), de¯nitely rejects the hypothesis that the location of
an authority does not a®ect its social service provision policy.8
This paper aims at exploring the causes of such spatial auto-correlation.
In the light of the welfare competition literature cited above, one could won-
der whether the spatial pattern in social spending in the UK is the outcome
of a similar sort of competition. However, the mobility of the bene¯ciaries
of personal social services is likely to be rather low, virtually ruling out the
7In the UK, the ¯nancial year starts on 1st April and ends on 31st March.
8The Moran test is a sort of spatial Durbin-Watson statistic that represents a measure
of the similarity in value (covariance) and association in space (contiguity). It is asymptot-
ically normally distributed under the null hypothesis of absence of spatial auto-correlation
(Anselin [1]). When computed on a raw measure of social service provision across the
146 English local authorities providing social services (the level of social expenditure per
bene¯ciary), the Moran test yields a value of 0.68, with a standard normal value of 16.8,
meaning that one can con¯dently reject the null of no spatial auto-correlation.
3race to the bottom hypothesis.
On the other hand, it can be argued that a spatial pattern in social
expenditures might arise from the existence of a local \informational" exter-
nality, even in the absence of the threat of welfare-induced migration. The
idea is that information about local public service provision in the neigh-
borhood is both relevant - because neighboring jurisdictions face a similar
socio-economic environment and are likely to experience similar shocks - and
easily available, because it naturally tends to spill over into adjacent jurisdic-
tions (Besley andCase [8]). As a result, the local information spill-over would
make it possible for imperfectly informed citizens to improve politicians' se-
lection, by evaluating the performance of their own government relative to
the performances of governments in nearby localities (Case [21]).
Furthermore, as well as a®ectingselection, comparative performance eval-
uation would also a®ect politicians' discipline: as a result of the spill-over
from neighboring jurisdictions, o±cials would exert more e®ort in order to
enhance their performance relative to their neighbors. The discipline ef-
fect of comparative performance evaluation would therefore generate a sort
of \yardstick competition" among local authorities, with o±cials mimicking
the behavior of nearby governments.9
The main objective of this paper is to ascertain whether the observed
spatial pattern in local welfare spending in the UK can indeed be attributed
to the discipline e®ect of yardstick competition, or if it can alternatively
be explained either by welfare competition or by the fact that neighboring
authorities are hit by correlated shocks (Manski [37]).
In order to accomplish this aim, this paper exploits the institutional
change that occurred in the UK in October 2001, when the Department
of Health (DoH) announced the introduction of a system of Social Services
Performance Rating (SSPR). The SSPR would produce every year, starting
9The idea of yardstick competition in a political agency framework was ¯rst put forward
by Ladd [36], Case [21] and Case et al. [22], and formalised by Besley and Case [8].
4from May 2002, a statistical overview of the performance and rating of each
council on a zero to three stars scale, based on the full range of available
evidence in the previous ¯nancial year.
The interesting aspect of the SSPR is that its objective is \to ensure
that social care issues are properly addressed, to promote good practice and
to identify councils that are performing poorly (...) The ratings are intended
to improve public information about the current performance of services (...)
People have a right to know how well their councils are performing in meeting
these responsibilities, whether they are receiving such services themselves,
have a family member receiving such services, or are a council tax payer."10
If the main objective of the SSPR is to improve public information about
local government performance in social service provision, then it could be
argued that the mimicking e®ect arising from local information spill-overs
should play a less important role after its introduction. In the presence of
a national system of performance evaluation, the relevance of the perfor-
mances of neighboring authorities decreases, since information is made easily
available on nation-wide practice in social service provision. Consequently,
analysing the degree of spatial auto-correlation in welfare spending before
and after the introduction of the SSPR should allow us to conclude whether
yardstick competition was indeed responsible for the observed spatial pat-
tern.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents a simple
model of the determination of local spending on personal social services, and
section 3 discusses the econometric issues involved in empirically implement-
ing it. Section 4 presents the estimation results, based on data for the 146
UK local governments that provide social services. Finally, section 5 pro-
vides some further testing of the yardstick competition hypothesis, section
6 explores whether the political complexion of local jurisdictions can help
explain their policy-making processes and spatial interaction patterns, and
10Social Services Inspectorate [51].
5section 7 concludes.
2 A model of social service provision
2.1 Model set-up
Consider a set of N local jurisdictions. In each jurisdiction i live gi identical
individuals that have zero income and own no property, and hi identical
individuals earning (exogenous) income qi and owning property of value bi.
Total population in the jurisdiction is: pi = gi + hi.
The government in each jurisdiction is in charge of providing social ser-
vices. The gi non-taxpayers directly bene¯t from expenditures on social
services, that are funded by the property taxes paid by the hi taxpayers.
While it is reasonable to think that taxpayers represent the majority of the
resident population (hi > gi), and do not directly bene¯t from social spend-
ing (but rather pay its cost), still there are a number of reasons why they
could favour social expenditure.11
The taxpayer's utility - equation (1) - depends on her own private con-
sumption(yi)andontheindirect bene¯ts shereceives from social expenditure
(si), with ci representing a vector of J community characteristics:
ui = u(yi;si;ci) (1)
Denoting by xi and mi the levels of per capita social expenditures and
per capita (lump-sum) central government grants, and assuming that the
local government budget constraint must be balanced, the taxpayer's budget
constraint can be expressed as:12
yi = qi ¡ ¿i(xi ¡ mi) (2)
where: ¿i =
pi
hi is the tax price of local public spending on social services.
11For a discussion of those theories, see Smith [50] and Shroder [47].
12The hypotheses of a local property tax, a balanced budget and lump-sum grants re°ect
the institutional features of the UK system of local government ¯nance.
6As for the bene¯t taxpayers get from social expenditure, it is reasonable
to assume (along with most of the welfare competition literature) that it
depends on social spending per bene¯ciary, that is total social expenditure





Given equations (2) and (3) above, the budget constraint can be re-
written as:
yi = e qi ¡ risi (4)
where: e qi = qi+¿imi is \full" income including central government grants
and ri =
gi
hi equals the usual recipiency ratio (Shroder [47]).
Utility maximisation subject to the budget constraint yields a demand
functionfor social services (si) that, following thecommonpractice inapplied




®jln(cij)+ ¸q ln(e qi) + ¸rln(ri) +"i (5)
where ¸q isthe income elasticity, ¸r is theprice (recipiencyratio) elasticity
and "i is a random term.
2.2 Local interaction in social policy making
In the presence of a decentralised welfare system and welfare recipients' mo-
bility, the recipiency ratio in each jurisdiction would be determined endoge-
nously, in that it woulddepend onsocial service provisioninjurisdiction i (si)
as well as on social service provision in nearby jurisdictions. Following the
spatial econometrics literature (Anselin [1]) as well as the recent empirical
works on local strategic interaction (Brueckner [17]), assume that the e®ect
on jurisdiction i of the welfare policies enacted in the neighborhood can be
expressed as a spatially weighted average of neighboring jurisdictions' expen-
ditures, with non-stochastic weights win > 0 for adjacent (border sharing)
7jurisdictions i and n (i;n = 1;:::;N).13 Using again a log-linear speci¯cation,










where °s > 0 and °¡s < 0. After taking logarithms, equation (6) is an
expression similar to equation (13) in Shroder [47].
Replacing the expression for the recipiency ratio in equation (5), one
obtains a reduced form reaction function that expresses a ¯rst-order spatial



















Equation (7) is commonly estimated in the empirical welfare competition
literature, where a non-zero estimate of parameter ¯¡s is taken as evidence
of welfare competition. Unfortunately, though, spatial auto-correlation in
local expenditures is compatible with alternative theoretical explanations.
Yardstick competition arising from a local information spill-over is one of
them (Bordignon et al. [12]).
The basic idea underlying yardstick competition is that voters are imper-
fectly informed about the actual cost required for providing public services,
and policymakers are heterogeneous with respect to e±ciency in public ser-
vice provision, in the sense that some politicians are more prone to waste
resources or to divert public revenues to private aims.14
13Some recent literature on local strategic interaction - starting from Case et al. [22] -
argues that local jurisdictions might regard as neighbors other jurisdictions that, while not
being geographically close, share common characteristics such as income level or demo-
graphic structure. I explore in section 6 below the role of similarity in political complexion.
14A formal model of yardstick competition in a political agency framework, that allows
policymakers to be either Pigouvian welfare-maximisers or self-interested Leviathan, is
in Besley and Case [8] and Besley and Smart [9]. Bordignon et al. [13] discuss the
selection and discipline e®ects of yardstick competition, under di®erent hypotheses about
the information sets of principals (voters) and agents (policy-makers).
8In a decentralised system of government, though, it is possible for imper-
fectly informed voters to improve selection of politicians, by evaluating the
e±ciency of their own government relative to governments in nearby local-
ities. Moreover, as a result of the information spill-over from neighboring
jurisdictions, o±cials would exert more e®ort in order to enhance their per-
formance relative totheir neighbors, andwouldendup mimicking the policies
of nearby governments (Besley and Case [8]).
The discipline e®ect of comparative performance evaluation can be intro-
duced into equation (5) by allowing the level of spending in jurisdiction i to




where win are positive non-stochastic weights on neighboring jurisdictions'
expenditures (Case et al. [22]). Positing now that the recipiency ratio r is




®j ln(cij) +¸q ln(e qi)+ ¸r ln(ri) + ®1[
N P
n=1
win ln(sn)]+ "i (9)
Equation (9) formalises the idea that a government can a®ord to set high
expenditures if its neighbors select high spending levels - as the information
spill-over conveys in that case the signal of a high cost of social services
due to exogenous factors over which politicians have no control - while it
will be forced to set low expenditure levels if neighbors' expenditures are
low. Hence, the spending level in a jurisdiction will tend to be positively
correlated (®1 > 0) with the expenditures in the neighborhood.15
Clearly, since both equation (7) and equation (9) include a spatial lag of
the dependent variable (
PN
n=1winln(sn)) among the explanatory variables,
it is not possible to discriminate between a welfare competition model and
15It has been argued (Besley and Case [8], Bordignon et al. [12]) that, if voters knew
the non-stochastic determinants of local expenditures in own and neighboring jurisdictions,
yardstick competition would yield correlation only among the unpredicted components of
local expenditures - that is the residual "i in equation (9). However, while we leave it to
the data to reveal the information set of voters, it seems likely that - at least in the social
services domain - voters are better informed about the overall burden of social expenditure
than about its stochastic versus non-stochastic determinants.
9a yardstick competition model by means of estimation of a spatial reaction
function only.
While, as argued above, the features of the UK system of welfare make
a migration-induced race to the bottom unlikely, still this paper provides
a way to discriminate among the two theories, by analysing the impact of
the introduction of the national performance assessment system on local
interaction patterns.
If spatial auto-correlation were due to welfare competition - parameter
¯¡s in equation (7) - then the introduction of the national performance as-
sessment system should have no e®ect on it, because it does not a®ect the
incentives for local authorities to compete with their neighbors to avoid in-
migration of welfare recipients.
On the other hand, if local information spill-overs were responsible for
the observed spatial auto-correlation in social spending - parameter ®1 in
equation (9) - then one should observe less spatial auto-correlation after the
introductionof the performanceassessment system basedonuniformnational
standards.
3 Empirical implementation
Turning to estimation of a spatial reaction function such as (9), standard
methods - OLS (ordinary least squares) - are biased because own and neigh-
bors' spending levels are determined simultaneously (Anselin [1]). Moreover,
the presence of a spatial process in the error term could give the wrong im-
pression of strategic interaction, even if none is really occurring (Brueckner
[15]).
To see how estimation is carried out, consider equation (10) below - the
matrix form analogue of (9) - expressing a SAR (spatial auto-regressive)
process in the dependent variable:
s = C®¡1 + ¸qe q + ¸rr + ®1Ws + " (10)
10where W is the row-standardised (N £ N) matrix of spatial weights win.
C is a (N £ (J ¡ 1)) matrix of exogenous variables, ®¡1 is a ((J ¡ 1) £ 1)
vector of parameters to be estimated, e q and r - representing income and
recipiency ratio respectively - are (N £ 1) vectors, and all variables are in
logarithm.
The well-known econometric problem that arises in the estimation of
equation (10) consists in separately identifying parameter ®1, expressing an
endogenous interaction e®ect, and a potential spatial process in the error
term ":
" = ½W´ + ´ (11)
where the (N £ 1) vector of error terms " is allowed to have a SMA
(spatial moving average) structure with parameter ½, with j½j < 1, while ´
is a (N £ 1) vector of innovations, with E(´´0) = ¾2
´I.
The identi¯cation problem is due to the fact that the spatial processes in
(10) and (11) tend to mimic each other, so that the presence of correlated
shocks might be mistaken for an endogenous interaction e®ect (Case [20]).16
Basically, two approaches exist for getting consistent estimates of the
spatial parameter ®1 in (10). The ¯rst one is based on an IV (instrumental
variables) principle, and consists in ¯nding variables that are correlated with
neighbors' endogenous variable (Ws), while not being correlated with ".17
IV is based on the idea of removing the bias-generating correlation between
the endogenous regressor Ws and the error term " (Kelejian and Prucha
[34]):
E[(Ws)"
0] = W(I¡ ®1W)
¡1(I +½W)(I+ ½W)0¾2
´ 6= 0 (12)
Estimation is performed by regressing s on the matrix [Z; d Ws], where
Z = [C; e q;r] and d Ws is the predicted value of neighbors' expenditures from
a ¯rst stage regression of Ws on the matrix of own and neighbors' exogenous
16The same holds for a spatial auto-regressive error term (Anselin [1]).
17Examples of estimation of spatial reaction functions based on IV methods are Ladd
[36], Figlio et al. [29], Buettner [19] and Fredriksson and Millimet [30], [31].
11variables [Z;WZ] (Kelejian and Robinson [35]). Since neighbors' spending
is instrumented, the 2SLS (two-stage least squares) estimate of ®1 is con-
sistent, because it is not a®ected by potential correlated shocks experienced
by neighbors (Besley and Case [8]). Moreover, the IV approach has the ad-
vantage of allowing us to control for potential endogeneity of further r.h.s.
variables in (10), such as the recipiency ratio.18
The second approach is based on an ML (maximum likelihood) principle
and consists in inverting the spatial reaction function (10) (Case et al. [22]):
s = (I¡ ®1W)
¡1Z±+(I¡ ®1W)
¡1" (13)
with: Z = [C; e q;r] and ±
0 = [®0
¡1;¸q;¸r]. ML is more e±cient, because it
allows us tocontrol for the spatial process in the error term explicitly. In fact,
the full model represented by equations (10) and (11) - known as a SARMA
(Spatial AutoRegressiveMoving Average) -can beinvertedand estimatedby
ML, by exploiting the properties of the well behaved error vector ´ (Anselin
and Florax [3]):19











where c¼ is a constant, and jJ½j = jI+½Wj and jJ®j = jI¡®1Wj are the
Jacobian terms of the transformation between ´ and s (Anselin [2]).
18According to the welfare competition hypothesis, the recipiency ratio would be de-
termined endogenously, and would consequently lead to biased estimates of the crucial
spatial parameter ®1.
19On the other hand, ML estimation poses serious identi¯cation problems in amodel that
has a ¯rst-order spatial auto-regressive process in the dependent variable - equation (10)
- with a ¯rst-order spatial auto-regressive process in the error term: " = ¸W" +À (see in
particular Anselin [1], pp. 87-88). For GMM (Generalised Method of Moments) estimation
and testing of a spatial auto-regressive model with spatial auto-regressive disturbances,
see Kelejian and Prucha [34] and Saavedra [44], [45].
12Inorderto learnabout therelativeimportance of the two spatial processes
driven by parameters ®1 and ½ respectively, and in particular to ascertain
whether the introduction of the performance assessment system has a®ected
the spatial interaction pattern in social expenditures, the next section shows
estimates of the spatial reaction function that are based on IV and ML prin-
ciples, both before and after the introduction of the ratings system.
4 Data and estimation results
I ¯rst estimate the social spending reaction function on the cross-sections of
146 local authorities in England in ¯nancial years 2000/2001 and 2003/2004,
that is before and after the introduction of the SSPR.20
The data set includes all English authorities providing personal social ser-
vices, namely 32 boroughs of the London metropolitan area, 36 metropolitan
districts of the other ¯ve metropolitan areas, 44 non metropolitan unitary
authorities, and 34 non metropolitan upper tier authorities (counties) in
two-tier areas. To account for potential institutional di®erences among those
authorities, the reaction function includes authority type dummies. Descrip-
tive statistics and data sources of all the variables used in the analysis are
reported in tables 1 and 2.21
The dependent variable is computed as total expenditure on personal
social services in a jurisdiction, divided by the number of income deprived
residents asa proxy for thenumberofusers of social services. WhiletheSSPR
is based uponandisintendedto improvethe quality of social serviceprovision
- that might not necessarily be correlated with the level of expenditure - the
hypothesis we wish to test here is whether local authorities react to the
20The SSPR went through a two-year transition period, as it was announced during
¯nancial year 2001/2002, and implemented throughout ¯nancial year 2002/2003, when
the ¯rst star ratings were released.
21The 146 authorities cover the whole of England and do not overlap in social service
provision. Two authorities are excluded because of missing data (unitary authority of
Swindon) or peculiar geographic location (unitary authority of Isle of Wight).
13introduction of the SSPR by changing their spending behavior.
The explanatory variables include central government lump-sum grants,
residential property tax base per capita as a proxy for income (income data
not being available at the local level), size and density of population, and the
percentages of old and young residents over total population. The recipiency
ratio is computed as the ratio of income deprived people to taxpayers.
However, if the recipiency ratio were in fact determined endogenously
due to welfare competition, both the price elasticity and the spatial auto-
regressive coe±cient would be estimated with a bias. Consequently, IV esti-
mation of (10) uses variables re°ecting the economic structure of a locality
- proportion of properties that are not devoted to domestic use (commercial
and industrial) and value of non-domestic property per capita - as instru-
ments for the recipiency ratio. While the above variables are likely to re°ect
reasonably well the economic complexion of a jurisdiction and are highly
correlated with the recipiency ratio, they can be reasonably thought of as
changing sluggishly over time, and consequently being exogenous at least in
the short run.22
The results for ¯nancial year 2000/2001 are shown in table 3, while the
results for ¯nancial year 2003/2004 are shown in table 4.23
First, the robust LM (Lagrange Multiplier) test developed by Anselin
et al. [4] for an alternative hypothesis of a spatial lag - equation (10) - as
well as the robust LM test for an alternative hypothesis of a spatial process
in the error term - equation (11) - are shown in the lower panel of table
3. The LM tests de¯nitely suggest that, in ¯nancial year 2000/2001 (before
22In theory, one could attempt to estimate a recipiency ratio determination equation
such as (6) (as in Shroder [47]). However, since yearly data on the actual number of users
of social services are not available and data on income deprived residents are from year
2000 only (Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [28]), it is not
feasible to estimate the impact of own and neighbors' social service expenditures on local
recipiency ratios.
23The equation also includes dummies according to the type of authority (London bor-
oughs, metropolitan districts, unitary authorities, counties). As none of them turns out
to be signi¯cant, though, they are not reported.
14the introduction of the performance assessment system), a spatial lag in the
dependent variable is the most likely source of spatial dependence. The
robust LM test for a spatial lag - that is distributed as a Â2
[1] - takes on the
value of7.96 (theÂ2
[1] value at p = 0:99 is 6.63), while the robust LM test for a
spatial process in the error term is 0.01. Moreover, the LR (likelihood ratio)
test reported at the bottom of column 1 in table 3 allows us to con¯dently
reject the restriction ®1 = 0 that is imposed in a non-spatial model.24
The results of estimation of equation (10) - upper panel of table 3 - show
strong and signi¯cant positive e®ects of grant and income on social spending
(grant elasticity ranging from 0.57 to 0.62 and income elasticity ranging from
0.21 to 0.23, depending on the speci¯cation), while the recipiency ratio turns
out to have a highly signi¯cant negative e®ect on social expenditure per
bene¯ciary. The OLS and ML estimates that treat the recipiency ratio as
exogenous - columns 1, 2 and 4 in table 3 - and the IV estimate that uses
exogenous structural characteristics of the jurisdiction as instruments, yield
similar values - a price elasticity ranging from -0.15 to -0.21.25 On the other
hand, the demographic variables do not have a signi¯cant impact, except for
a positive e®ect of density of population.
Finally, the estimates of the crucial spatial parameters yield consistent
results. The ML estimate of ®1 in the SAR speci¯cation that does not allow
for correlated errors - column 2 in table 3 - is 0.18. As expected, it is lower
than the OLS estimate of ®1, because OLS does not control for simultaneity
of own and neighbors' decisions. The IV estimate and the ML estimate of
®1 that controls for a spatial pattern in the error term - columns 3 and 4
24Twice the di®erence between the log-likelihoods of the restricted and unrestricted
models is distributed as a Â2 with degrees of freedom equal to the number of restrictions
- number of spatial parameters set to zero (Anselin [1]).
25Moreover, when the residuals from a ¯rst stage regression of the recipiency ratio on the
matrix of instruments are inserted into equation (10) as a regressor (a Hausman endogene-
ity test), the coe±cient on the residuals is not estimated to be signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero (F(1;134) test = 2.8), suggesting that the recipiency ratio can be treated as exogenous
in (10).
15in table 3 - yield an elasticity of about 0.20, while spatial dependence in
the residuals (parameter ½) is estimated to be negative, but not statistically
signi¯cant. It is interesting to notice that the OLS bias turns out to be very
small, suggesting that the upward OLS bias provokedby positive spatial auto-
correlation in the dependent variable (the term W(I¡ ®1W)
¡1 in equation
(12)) is almost fully o®set by the downward OLS bias determined by negative
correlation in the residuals (the term (I+½W)(I+½W)0¾2
´ in equation (12)).
Turning to ¯nancial year 2003/2004, the results are shown in table 4.
If the auto-correlation that emerged in ¯nancial year 2000/2001 were due
to yardstick competition arising from a local information spill-over, then we
should expect to observe less of it after the introduction of the performance
rating system.
The coe±cient estimates for ¯nancial year 2003/2004 closely resemble
the ones for ¯nancial year 2000/2001, with a large and signi¯cant positive
e®ect of grant on expenditure (almost 0:8), a positive and signi¯cant income
elasticity (0.2), and a negative and signi¯cant e®ect of the recipiency ratio
(a price elasticity of about ¡0:1).
As far as local interaction is concerned, it turns out that spatial auto-
correlation in social spending has dropped dramatically. The estimated size
of the auto-regressive coe±cient ®1 falls from a value of 0:20 obtained for
¯nancial year 2000/2001 in table 3 to a value of 0:09 in 2003/2004 (table 4),
and ®1 is not estimated to be signi¯cantly di®erent from zero any longer.
5 Evaluating the impact of the SSPR
Inspection of the results of estimation of the spatial reaction function on
the cross-sections of 2000/01 and 2003/04 points to a noticeable change in
the spatial pattern of social spending. In particular, the Moran test on the
predicted residuals from a non spatial model (®1 = 0) - that is distributed
as a standard normal z(0;1) - falls from 2.12 in 2000/01 to 0.37 in 2003/04,
16suggesting that the null hypothesis of no spatial auto-correlation can no
longer be rejected. Moreover, the robust LM test for spatial lag dependence
- that is distributed as a Â2
[1] - falls from a value of 7.96 in ¯nancial year
2000/2001 to a value of 2.58 in 2003/2004 (the Â2
[1] value at p = 0:95 is
3.84), and the likelihood ratio test of a spatial lag model against a non-
spatial speci¯cation - that again is distributed as a Â2
[1] - drops from 9.42 in
2000/2001 to 2.01 in 2003/2004, suggesting that the restriction ®1 = 0 that
would be imposed in a non-spatial speci¯cation cannot be rejected. In line
with the test results, ®1 is not estimated to be signi¯cantly di®erent from
zero in the latter cross-section.
Inorder toformally testthe impactof theSSPR andtoconvince ourselves
of the signi¯cance of the reductionin spatial auto-correlation, table 5 reports
estimates of the spatial auto-regressive model in equation (10) on the pooled
cross-sections of 2000/2001 through 2003/2004, while allowing the spatial
interaction term to be di®erent in the latter cross-section, when the SSPR is
fully in operation.
The results in table 5 show that while the estimate of ®1 is a highly
signi¯cant positive value of about 0:15, interacting the neighbors' variable
with the SSPR dummy yields a large and signi¯cant negative e®ect (¡0:09).
Moreover, the likelihood of a model that restricts ®1 to be constant across
the four waves is signi¯cantly lower than the likelihood of an unrestricted
model that allows ®1 to be di®erent in the latter cross-section, with the LR
test reported at the bottom of table 5 rejecting the restriction of a constant
®1 at the 99% level of con¯dence.26
Overall, the above evidence consistently suggests that spatial correlation
in local expenditures on social services has dropped considerably. In par-
26When estimation is performed on a model that allows for ¯xed jurisdiction e®ects,
the estimates turn out to be considerably less precise - probably due to the fact that the
time-series is short (4 years) and that one cross-section is lost in taking deviations from
the mean. Still, the ML estimate of ®1 is a large value of 0:24 (t=2:69) and the coe±cient
on neighbors' spending interacted with the SSPR dummy is ¡0:36 (t=1:96).
17ticular, it supports the idea that, by spreading information on nation-wide
practice in social service provision, the SSPR has diminished the relevance of
local information spill-overs andweakened the incentives for local authorities
to mimic the policies of neighboring jurisdictions.
6 Politics
The above analysis might be missing an important point, by disregarding the
role of politics in the local expenditure determination process. In particular,
it could be argued that local jurisdictions should be more strongly a®ectedby
the policies enacted by governments that are controlled by the same political
party. For instance, taxpayers living in Labour controlled jurisdictions could
more likely take the performances of other Labour governments (rather than
Conservative or Liberal Democrat ones) as a benchmark against which to
compare the performance of their own government.
Consequently, I re-estimated the social expenditure reaction function
(10), both by including a political party dummy (Labour, Conservative or
Liberal Democrat) to control for possible di®erences in social service provi-
sion policy due to ideology, and by using a spatial weights matrix where only
neighboring governments controlled by the same political party are given a
positive weight.27
Somewhat surprisingly, though, it comes out that the political control
dummies are estimated to have no e®ect on expenditures on social services,
in the sense that Labour governments do not set expenditure levels per bene-
¯ciary that are higher than Liberal Democrat or Conservative ones. Rather,
the data tend to suggest that it is indeed more likely to ¯nd a Labour gov-
ernment in jurisdictions with high poverty rates: the correlation coe±cient
27In particular, the politically-weighted neighborhood matrix is constructed in such a
way that neighboring authorities are given a weight equal to 1 if they are controlled by
the same political party, and 0 otherwise, and it is standardised by dividing each element
of the matrix by the matrix row-sum (number of neighbors of the same political party).
18between the Labour government dummy and the poverty rate is almost
0.6, while the correlation coe±cient between the Conservative government
dummy and the poverty rate is -0.5. However, after controlling for the price
of social services to residents and the other local characteristics that are
believed to a®ect social service provision (matrix Z = [C; e q;r]), Labour con-
trolled authorities turn out to be no more generous than Conservative and
Liberal Democrat governments.
Coherentlywiththeabove result, it comesoutthatspatial auto-correlation
in expenditures is no stronger among jurisdictions that are controlled by the
same political party than among jurisdictions controlledby di®erent political
parties. The results obtained by means of a politically weighted neighbor-
hood matrix are in line with those obtained with a standard unweighted
neighborhood matrix and suggest, perhaps surprisingly, that politics does
not play a signi¯cant role in inter-governmental interaction in social service
provision.
7 Concluding remarks
This paper has proposed a strategy for identifying yardstick competition,
that is based upon the exploitation of an institutional change that occurred
inthe UK in 2001, withtheintroductionofanationalsystem of social services
performance rating (SSPR). Since the main objective of the SSPR consists
in improving public information about local authority performance, it should
reduce theimportance oflocal information spill-overs, by making information
on nation-wide practice in social service provision easily available.
The results for ¯nancial year 2000/01 - before the introduction of the
SSPR - suggest that local jurisdictions tend to mimic the policies of their
neighbors. In particular, the IV and ML estimates of the coe±cient on
the spatially lagged expenditure variable yield roughly the same elasticity
of 0.20, while spatial dependence in the residuals is estimated not to be
19signi¯cantly di®erentfrom zero. Onthe other hand, when analysingthe same
expenditures after the SSPR was at work (2003/04), the test and estimation
results show that spatial auto-correlation in social spending has decreased
considerably and turns out not to be statistically signi¯cant any longer. The
same results are obtained when the four available waves of data (2000/01 to
2003/04) are pooled, suggesting that the introduction of the rating system
has signi¯cantly moderated the scope for policy mimicking.
The results in this paper represent just a ¯rst step in the analysis of
the impact of national evaluation of decentralised government performance
on spatial interactions among local jurisdictions. In particular, investigat-
ing how the release of nation-wide performance ratings a®ects the behavior
and mimicking patterns of local authorities seems to represent a stimulating
avenue for future research.
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25Table 1 Descriptive statistics: ¯nancial year 2000/2001
obs. mean std. dev. min max source
social expenditure p.b. ($) 146 1,012 347 529 2,353 C1
grant p.b. ($) 146 839 221 433 1,634 D1
income (tax base p.c., $) 146 26,520 4,134 19,188 42,354 C1
population density 146 24.3 26.2 0.6 133.2 C1
population (,000) 146 338 251 36 1,332 C1
percentage old 146 7.0 1.5 4.3 12.7 C2
percentage young 146 14.0 1.3 9.1 17.6 C2
recipiency ratio 146 0.24 0.09 0.07 0.51 D2
% non-domestic properties 146 7.3 2.0 4.3 23.0 C1
non-domestic property p.c. ($) 146 806.7 915.8 321.6 10626.9 C1
Labour 84 H1
Conservative 38 H1






1) p.b. = per bene¯ciary;
2) p.c. = per capita;
3) tax base per capita = domestic property value per capita;
4) recipiency ratio = income deprived people/taxpayers;
5) C1: CIPFA [23];
6) C2: CIPFA [25];
7) D1: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [26];
8) D2: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [28];
9) H1: House of Commons, Social and General Statistics Section [33].
26Table 2 Descriptive statistics: ¯nancial year 2003/2004
obs. mean std. dev. min max source
social expenditure p.b. ($) 146 1,388 465 771 3,192 C1
grant p.b. ($) 146 1,087 305 626 2,026 D1
income (tax base p.c., $) 146 26,832 4,290 19,500 48,594 C1
population density 146 24.2 26.3 0.6 128.5 C1
population (,000) 146 336 253 35 1,331 C1
percentage old 146 7.0 1.5 4.3 12.7 C2
percentage young 146 14.0 1.2 9.1 17.6 C2
recipiency ratio 146 0.24 0.09 0.07 0.48 D2
% non-domestic properties 146 7.1 1.9 4.2 22.8 C1
non-domestic property p.c. ($) 146 856.1 1098.8 332.6 13058.9 C1
Labour 78 H1
Conservative 45 H1






1) p.b. = per bene¯ciary;
2) p.c. = per capita;
3) tax base per capita = domestic property value per capita;
4) recipiency ratio = income deprived people/taxpayers;
5) C1: CIPFA [24];
6) C2: CIPFA [25];
7) D1: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [27];
8) D2: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions [28];
9) H1: House of Commons, Social and General Statistics Section [33].
27Table 3 Spatial model estimation: ¯nancial year 2000/2001
1 2 3 4
SAR SAR SAR SARMA
OLS ML 2SLS ML
constant 0.704 (0.68) 0.602 (0.61) 0.745 (0.72) 0.471 (0.98)
grant 0.577 (6.20) 0.614 (7.04) 0.568 (6.12) 0.624 (6.74)
income 0.219 (1.62) 0.233 (1.80) 0.211 (1.56) 0.212 (1.45)
recipiency ratio -0.210 (-4.21) -0.148 (-4.14) -0.213 (-4.29) -0.145 (-3.98)
population density 0.029 (2.11) 0.028 (2.11) 0.029 (2.10) 0.026 (1.87)
population -0.022 (-0.95) -0.022 (-0.98) -0.023 (-1.00) -0.024 (-1.02)
% old -0.067 (-1.37) -0.074 (-1.58) -0.064 (-1.32) -0.081 (-1.54)
% young -0.102 (-0.83) -0.058 (-0.51) -0.108 (-0.88) -0.050 (-0.43)
®1 0.195 (3.07) 0.185 (3.13) 0.208 (3.24) 0.197 (2.77)
½ -0.105 (-0.29)
Moran I test 2.12
robust LM test ®1 7.96
robust LM test ½ 0.01
LR test 9.42
authority type dummies yes yes yes yes
observations 146 146 146 146
Notes
1) dependent variable: log(social spending per bene¯ciary);
2) t statistics in parentheses;
3) ®1 = auto-regressive coe±cient on spatially lagged dependent variable:
equation (10);
4) ½ = coe±cient on moving average process in the error term: equation (11);
5) the Moran I test is distributed as a standard normal z(0;1);
6) the LM and LR tests are distributed as Â2
(1).
28Table 4 Spatial model estimation: ¯nancial year 2003/2004
1 2 3 4
SAR SAR SAR SARMA
OLS ML 2SLS ML
constant 0.272 (0.28) 0.284 (0.31) 0.433 (0.44) 0.151 (0.14)
grant 0.769 (7.57) 0.772 (7.89) 0.736 (7.09) 0.779 (8.10)
income 0.230 (1.94) 0.231 (2.06) 0.226 (1.93) 0.230 (1.94)
recipiency ratio -0.113 (-2.03) -0.114 (-2.17) -0.130 (-2.28) -0.103 (-1.91)
population density 0.017 (1.31) 0.017 (1.40) 0.018 (1.39) 0.016 (1.25)
population -0.025 (-1.15) -0.025 (-1.20) -0.027 (-1.25) -0.028 (-1.32)
% old 0.033 (0.72) 0.032 (0.75) 0.031 (0.70) 0.030 (0.72)
% young -0.127 (-1.12) -0.127 (-1.18) -0.137 (-1.21) -0.110 (-0.93)
®1 0.081 (1.40) 0.077 (1.42) 0.098 (1.67) 0.092 (1.64)
½ -0.180 (-0.93)
Moran I test 0.37
robust LM test ®1 2.58
robust LM test ½ 0.65
LR test 2.01
authority type dummies yes yes yes yes
observations 146 146 146 146
Notes
1) dependent variable: log(social spending per bene¯ciary);
2) t statistics in parentheses;
3) ®1 = auto-regressive coe±cient on spatially lagged dependent variable:
equation (10);
4) ½ = coe±cient on moving average process in the error term: equation (11);
5) the Moran I test is distributed as a standard normal z(0;1);
6) the LM and LR tests are distributed as Â2
(1).




grant 0.796 (15.38) 0.811 (15.59) 0.821 (15.40)
income -0.037 (-0.75) -0.048 (-0.93) -0.045 (-0.87)
recipiency ratio -0.176 (-6.86) -0.171 (-6.65) -0.171 (-6.54)
population density 0.023 (3.57) 0.023 (3.51) 0.023 (3.52)
population -0.027 (-2.47) -0.027 (-2.44) -0.026 (2.32)
% old -0.039 (-1.76) -0.038 (-1.71) -0.042 (1.83)
% young -0.113 (-2.08) -0.108 (-1.94) -0.104 (1.85)
®1 0.134 (4.79) 0.153 (5.31) 0.140 (4.38)
®1 £ D(SSPR) -0.086 (-2.62) -0.090 (2.75)
LR test 6.77
time dummies yes yes yes
authority type dummies yes yes yes
observations 584 584 584
Notes
1) dependent variable: log(social spending per bene¯ciary);
2) t statistics in parentheses;
3) ®1 = auto-regressive coe±cient on spatially lagged dependent variable:
equation (10);
4) D(SSPR): dummy variable equal to 1 in ¯nancial year 2003/2004, 0 oth-
erwise;
5) the LR test is distributed as Â2
(1);
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